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GENETIC SCREENING: AN EMPLOYER'S




"This is about who gets to decide if the job is too unsafe."
-Samuel Bagenstos'
According to Mr. Samuel Bagenstos, the job applicant or employee
should be the one to determine whether a job is unsafe.2 It is also the
opinion of many others, including the Ninth Circuit.3 In Echazabal v.
Chevron, the Ninth Circuit held that an employer may not refuse to hire
an applicant where the position would pose a direct threat to the
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1. Court Considers Implications of Disabilities Act, CNN.coM. (Feb. 27,
2002), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/law/02/27/scotus.disability/index.html.
[hereinafter Court Considers Implications of Disabilities Act] (Mr. Bagenstos
represented Mario Echazabal, the respondent, in Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000), reversed and remanded by 122 S. Ct. 2045
(2002)).
2- Court Considers Implications of Disabilities Act, supra note 1.
3. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Council on Disability at 14, Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002) (no. 00-1406) ("The 'threat to
self' defense fosters the view that people with disabilities need to be protected
from themselves and from their choices. This case is about who is best able to
make those personal decisions .... ).
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applicant's health or safety.4 Subsequently, the Supreme Court overturned
the Ninth Circuit's decision questioning the employer's authority to select,
within the given statutory restrictions, the most qualified employees.5 By
doing so, the Supreme Court reinforced the employer's authority to
decline to hire applicants whose health and safety may be directly
threatened by exposure to the chemicals resident in the workplace.6 This
decision lays another support beam in a debate that has grown in volume
over the past fifteen years as technology and medical research have begun
to unravel the mysteries of human genetic composition This debate
involves employers whose work environments expose their employees to
chemicals or toxins linked to the onset of specific illnesses. The argument
focuses on whether the employer can use genetic screening to identify
applicants with genetic predisposition to those illnesses and refuse to hire
them. Similar to Echazabal, the underlying concerns are two fold (1) the
employee's health and (2) the employer's requirement to ensure a safe
work environment. However, unlike the employee in Echazabal, these
employees may not have any symptoms. The issue here rests on the
probability of an illness becoming symptomatic.
4. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1072 ("Congress concluded that disabled persons
should be afforded the opportunity to decide for themselves which risks to
undertake.").
5. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2045. See also Echazabal, 226 F.3d at
1075. (Trott J., dissenting opinion.) ("Finally, and fortunately, we have created a
conflict with the Eleventh Circuit, which held that 'an employer may fire a
disabled employee if the disability renders the employee a 'direct threat' to his
own health and safety.' I say 'fortunately' because this conflict will compel the
Supreme Court -or Congress - to resolve this dispute...").
6. Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, 2002 U.S App. LEXIS 19730, at *18 (3d Cir.
2002) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b) (2002) and Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 122 S.Ct. at
2049) ("For example, an employer is not required to provide a reasonable
accommodation.. .if it would pose a 'direct threat' to the safety of the employee
or others .... ").
7. See generally Edna Lee Sweltz, Genetic Testing in the Workplace: An
Analysis of the Legal Implications, 19 FORUM 323 (1984) (discussing the "legal and
medical implications of genetic testing in the workplace and proposing a testing
framework which attempts to accommodate what the individual sees as a right to
work with attainment of a safe and healthy workplace for as many people as
possible."). See also Genetic Screening in the Workplace, Position Statement of
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, (Oct. 24, 1994)
(recommending the use of genetic testing on employees where it directly affects
job performance, or if the trait being screened for predisposes a worker to a
significant adverse outcome following otherwise acceptable exposure.)
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This comment will explore the employer's right to refuse to employ pre-
symptomatic individuals. Part I will consider the employer's interest in a
healthy workforce. Part II will provide a tutorial on genetic testing. Part
III will discuss the two federal statutes that address the use of pre-
employment examinations to assess the protections they afford to
individuals with genetic predispositions to illnesses. More specifically,
Part III will explore whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 9 prohibit the use of pre-
employment physical examinations. Based upon this discussion, Part IV
will consider whether an employer should use genetic testing in the
employment process. In conclusion, this comment will discuss the
employer's use of genetic tests in making employment decisions.
I. CURRENT SITUATION: DISCRIMINATION OR COST OF DOING
BUSINESS?
Early in the 1980s, scientists predicted they could unravel the genetic
make-up of human beings. To advance that goal, scientists established
causal links between specific genes and specific diseases.'" Once identified,
these links could identify specific environmental properties that could be
harmful to persons with a genetic predisposition to a specific illness."
Consumer groups and employee rights activists responded to this
achievement with concerns about how this genetic information could be
used. 2 Their concerns include the insurance industry's possible use of
information predicting whether an individual would develop a debilitating
disease, such as Alzheimer's Disease or Cystic Fibrosis, to raise that
individual's insurance rates or refuse coverage. 3 Others warn of the ease
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c) (2000).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
10. Robert Bazell, Scientists Map Human Chromosome, MSNBC, (Dec. 1,
2001) at http://stacks.msnbc.com/news. ("Scientists already know that genes on
chromosome 22 play a role in 35 diseases, including some cancers, schizophrenia,
deafness and heart disease.").
11. Judith Richter, Taking the Worker as You Find Him: The Quandary of
Protecting the Rights as Well as the Health of the Worker With a Genetic
Susceptibility to Occupational Disease, 8 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189, 190
(1997).
12. Clarie Andre and Manuel Velasques, Read My Genes: Genetic Screening
in the Workplace. ISSUES IN ETHICS (Fall 1991), available at
http://www.scu.edu/scu/ ethics/publications/iie/v4n2/genes.html.
13. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace:
Employee's Right to Privacy v. Employer's Need to Know, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 139,
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with which employers could use this information to discriminate among
job applicants and deny promotion opportunities to employees with the
intent of reducing the company's health insurance rates. 14 These concerns
are real. Surveys report instances in which individuals who disclosed
genetic information have lost their jobs, promotion opportunities and
insurance coverage.'" This information led to twenty-six states enacting
statutes prohibiting private employers and insurance companies from
using genetic information to discriminate against applicants and
employees, as well as an Executive Order prohibiting such practice by the
federal government.
16
However, concerns about discriminatory uses of genetic information
have overshadowed its benefits to both the employer and employees.
Research has advanced identifying additional environmental factors as
having a potential triggering effect on specific diseases. In some cases, it is
now possible to identify individuals of a specific genetic make-up, or
genetic predisposition, who will become ill after prolonged exposure to
certain toxins or chemicals.'7 Alarmingly, some illnesses can be contracted
even if the level of exposure is safe by industry standards. 8 In these
instances, the use of genetic tests can directly benefit both the employee
148 (2001) (discussing the 1982 and 1989 Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
surveys of the 500 largest companies in the United States concerning their use and
intention to use genetic medical information); See also Jeroo S. Kotval. Ph.D.,
Market-Driven Managed Care and the Confidentiality of Genetic Tests: The
Institution as Double Agent, 9 ALB L.J. Sci & TECH. 1, 16 (1998) ("Within the
context of institutions such as market driven MCOs, special concerns are raised by
genetic tests that provide predictive power about future health care costs. In
particular, these tests would include those for adult onset disorders... especially
those disorders with high associated costs. Such tests would pose serious
temptations for intuitions preoccupied with saving money.").
14. Andre, supra note 12.
15. Pagnattaro, supra note 13, at 154-55. See also Denise K. Casey, Genes,
Dreams, and Realities: The Promise and Risks of the New Genetics, 83 JUDICATURE
105 (1999) (discussing discriminatory practices of employer's use of
genetic/medical information).
16. Joanne Seltzer, The Cassandra Complex: An Employer's Dilemma in the
Genetic Workplace, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 411, 438 (1998); See Pagnattaro, supra
note 13, at 156 (providing an overview of Exec. Order No. 13145, 65 Fed. Reg.
6,877 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination against employees based on protected
genetic information)); See also Pagnattaro, supra note 13, at 173 (discussing
statutory protection); See also Richter, supra note 11, at 218-20 (discussing
statutory protection).
17. See Seltzer, supra note 16, at 440.
18. Richter, supra note 11, at 191-92.
Genetic Screening
and the employer in several ways. First, the tests personalize the
workplace risk to an applicant's or employee's health. Second, the test
results provide the employee with important information with which to
base life-style choices. These choices may assist in delaying or preventing
the onset of specific diseases and may assist the employee in making
informed decisions regarding exposure to specific environments.19
For the employer, it is a sound business decision. Maintaining a healthy
and productive workforce is cost effective, and employers have a
legitimate interest in adopting policies that protect their employees and
business. 20 They also have a justifiable interest in encouraging safety and
efficiency. 2' These laudable goals tend to reduce health care and worker's
compensation costs. 2  Cuts in these areas generally increase profitability
and positively impact employee morale and employee efficiency.23 For
example, each day, 137 persons die from work-related diseases." In 2000,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that over 5.7 million nonfatal
19. Andre, supra note 12.
20. Id. See also Brief of Amici Curiae for the United States and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission at 10, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 122 S. Ct. 2045
(2002) (no. 00-1406) ("Maintaining a safe workplace is itself a business necessity.")
[hereinafter EEOC Amici Curiae Brief].
21. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n. 31 (1979).
22. Richter, supra note 11, at 194. Workers' compensation claims also impact
an employer's bottom line and therefore efforts serving to reduce these costs could
play a factor in the employer's decision to conduct genetic screening. This is a
strict liability system where employers assume responsibility for their employee's
injuries arising out of its business without regard to fault. This system allows for a
relatively inexpensive and prompt means for settling claims where, in exchange for
smaller but certain compensation, injured workers waive their rights to sue in tort
and the employer waives its possible defenses to tort claims. Id.
23. Haig Neville, Workplace Safety Requires More than a Band-Aid, SILICON
VALLEY/SAN JOSE Bus. J. (Feb. 22, 1999), avaliable at http://sanjose.bizjournals.
com/sanjose/stories/1999/02122/focusll.html (on file with author). ("Investing in a
safer workplace cuts the expense of treating injured workers and helps companies
control insurance premiums and prevent workplace accidents... effective safety
standards in the workplace boost employee morale by conveying the message that
the company cares enough about its people to protect their health and safety.");
See also EEOC Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 20, ("Likewise, serious workplace
injuries pose other unique costs on employers in terms of the decreased morale
and productivity of employees who may question the employer's commitment to
workplace safety up hearing that an employee has suffered injury or even died, on
the job.").
24. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Healthy People 2010, (on file
with author) [hereinafter "Healthy People 2010"].
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injuries and illnesses in private industry were reported in 1999, including
372,000 cases of work-related illness.2 5  The National Safety Council
reported in 1996 that on-the-job injuries alone cost society $121 billion,
representing the sum of lost wages, lost productivity, administrative
expenses, health care and other costs. 26 The costs associated with sick
leave, absenteeism, worker's compensation and loss of goodwill are all
attributed to sick employees. 27 Efforts to reduce work-related diseases and
illnesses are important to employees, business and society. Scientific
evidence of casual links between genetic predispositions and
environmental factors may play a substantial role in future efforts.
Therefore, it is critical to understand how to use genetic testing as an
effective tool to advance legitimate business objectives of safety and
enhanced efficiency in the least discriminatory manner.
II. GENETIC TESTING: IS IT READY FOR PRIME TIME?
The Human Genome Project (HGP) has contributed to the
advancements in genetic research in the United States." The HGP is a
joint effort between the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and
the United States Department of Health and Human Services' National
Institutes of Health (NIH).29 In 1990, Congress challenged these agencies
25. Press Release, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. Dept. of Labor,
Workplace Injuries and Illnesses in 1999 (Dec. 12, 2000) available at
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.releasehistoryosh.12122000.news. ("The survey
measures the number of new work-related illness cases that are recognized,
diagnosed, and reported during the year. Some conditions (for example, long-term
latent illnesses caused by exposure to carcinogens) often are difficult to relate to
the workplace and are not adequately recognized and reported. These long-term
latent illnesses are believed to be understated in the survey's illness measures.").
26. Healthy People 2010, supra note 24, at 2. See also BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, supra note 25 (in 1996 there were over 6.2 million nonfatal injuries and
illnesses in private industry).
27. Seltzer, supra note 16, at 449; See also Andre supra note 12, at 2.
(Litigation over illnesses associated with hazardous worksite substances pose
heavy costs. By reducing occupational disease, genetic screening could reduce
costs of lowered productivity, excess absenteeism and heavy employee turnover, as
well as costs associated with workers compensation payments, and health
insurance.).
28. U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, Human Genome Project Information, available at
http://www.ornl.gov. (Last modified December 1999) [hereinafter "HGP
Information"].
29. Casey, supra note 15, at 2 (the project also includes international research
teams, including those from the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan).
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to map the human genome 30 sequence by 2005."' The human genome is the
complete set of coded instructions, which the human body uses for making
and maintaining itself.3 2 The HGP met this challenge in 2000, when it
successfully developed the first working draft of the entire human genome
33
sequence.
Understanding the human genome, and the DNA chemicals of which it
is comprised, will allow scientists and doctors to develop new, more
effective ways to treat, cure and even prevent the thousands of diseases
that afflict humankind.34 Moreover, particular conditions or physiological
responses can be determined by the genetic make-up created or inherited
at the formation of one's DNA.35 For example, some conditions, such as
Cystic Fibrosis and prostate cancer, can be inherited.36 Even the particular
ability to respond to environmental stresses, such as viruses, bacteria and
30. Id.
The complete human genome is packaged into 46 pieces of DNA called
chromosomes. Humans receive a set of 23 chromosomes from each
parent. A complete set of 46 chromosomes is found in almost every one
of our trillions of cells. Most cell types-skin, bone, hair, brain, heart-
contain a complete human genome. Exceptions are sperm and egg cells,
which contain 23 chromosomes, half the amount of DNA found in other
cells; and mature red blood cells, which lack DNA.
Id.
31. HGP Information, supra note 28 (project goals are to: 1) identify all the
approximately 30,000 genes in human DNA, 2) determine the sequences of the 3
billion chemical base pairs that make up human DNA, 3) store this information in
databases, 4) improve tools for data analysis, 5) transfer related technologies to the
private sector, and 6) address the ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI) that may
arise from the project). (emphasis in original)
32 Id.
33. Id. (stating that the human genome sequence was announced in June 2000
and its analysis was published in February 2001).
34. Id. See also Laura Murphy, Alzheimer's-Screened Birth Fosters 'Designer
Babies' Fear, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2002, at A10 ("A test-tube baby girl was born
free of her mother's early onset Alzheimer's disease after doctors performed a
genetic screening of the woman's embryos for [the] unwanted gene."); See also
Casey, supra note 15 (discussing gene therapy genetic enhancements, preventative
medicine and customized therapies).
35. Seltzer, supra note 16, at 433-34 (discussing genetic discoveries associated
with diseases, physical ailments, and human social disorders).
36. Press Release, National Human Genome Research Institute, Researchers
Link Gene to Hereditary Form of Prostate Cancer (Jan. 20, 2002) available at
http://www.genome.gov/page.cpm?pagel0=10000475 (announcing a gene in
chromosome 1 is associated with an inherited form of prostate cancer).
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toxins that can lead to the onset of more complex disorders, are
inherited.37 Some 4000 diseases, including sickle cell anemia and Tay
Sachs, are due to a single mutation in one gene.8 Other diseases, such as
heart disease, diabetes, cancers and Alzheimer's, are thought to be more
complex. These complex diseases include a variety of gene mutations. '9
These gene mutations act in concert, or in combination, with
environmental factors, like diet, radiation exposure or toxins, to trigger
the disease."°
A variety of genetic tests41 have been developed to screen for genetic
disorders.42 While the majority of these tests are used strictly for research,
approximately 100 are commercially available.43 The cost for genetic tests
can range from ten dollars to thousands of dollars, depending on the size
of the genes examined and the number of mutations tested." These
commercially available tests identify mutations associated with those
diseases in which just a single gene is involved, such as asamyotrophic
lateral sclerosis (ALS) (more commonly called Lou Gehrig's Disease),
inherited breast, ovarian cancer and Cystic Fibrosis.45 For example, a $200
blood test can identify whether a person has a genetic disorder that
doubles his chances of developing colon cancer." However, not all genetic
predispositions will manifest into the disease. These tests assist physicians
in identifying appropriate treatments, clarifying a diagnosis and identifying
individuals who are considered at high risk for diseases that may be
37. Id.
3& Id.
39. Id. See also Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic
Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 225, 228 (2000).
40. Id.
41. Human Genome Project Information, Gene Testing, at http://www.ornl.
gov/hgmis/medicine/genetest.html (last modified Feb. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Gene
Testing, HGP Info]. (Uses of genetic tests include 1) carrier screening, which
involves identifying unaffected individuals who carry one copy of a gene for a
disease that requires two copies for the disease to be expressed; 2) prenatal
diagnostic testing; 3) newborn screening; 4) presymptomatic testing for predicting
adult-onset disorders such as Huntington's disease; 5) presymptomatic testing for
estimating the risk of developing adult-onset cancers and Alzheimer's disease; 6)
confirmational diagnosis of a symptomatic individual; and 7) forensic/identity
testing.).
4Z Id.
43. Id. See Casey, supra note 15.
44. Gene Testing, HGP Info, supra note 41.
45. Id.
46. See Pagnattaro, supra note 13, at 143.
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treatable or preventable. 7 As a result, "aggressive monitoring for and
removal of colon growths in those inheriting a gene for familial
adenamatous polyposis has saved lives. 48
Commercial gene tests are available for some of the complex disorders
that usually manifest in adults, such as Alzheimer's disease and some
cancers.4 9 Like the single gene tests, these tests can be conducted on
healthy individuals who do not have any symptoms. However, adult-onset
disorder tests are usually administered only on those considered at high
risk due to their family medical history.0 The complexity of adult-onset
disorders also prevents an absolute diagnosis that one will contract the
disorder.5 Scientists believe that the genetic mutations causing the
disorder's onset work together with other unknown mutations or
environmental factors to cause disease. 2 Approximately fifty genetic
disorders that increase a person's susceptibility to the toxic and
carcinogenic effects of environmental agents have been identified.53 For
example, exposure to carbon monoxide and cyanide has been linked to an
increased risk of developing symptoms of sickle cell anemia. In many
cases, scientists know the link between the cellular mutation and a specific
disorder and understand the environmental triggers, such as radiation or
exposure to copper.55 However, the exact mechanism that triggers the
disorder's onset, such as duration or quantity of exposure, is not as clear. 6
In addition to this ambiguity, a question exists concerning test accuracy
due to laboratory error and difficulty interpreting the results. As such,
many in the medical research community recommend using these tests
solely for research until technology sufficiently advances. 17
47. Gene Testing, HGP Info, supra note 41.
4& Id. (noting a new diagnostic test is in development that will turn a fatal
iron-storage disease into a treatable one).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. See also Miller, supra note 39, at 231.
52 See Gene Testing, HGP Info, supra note 41.
53. Andre, supra note 12.
54. Pagnattaro, supra note 13, at 147.
55. Sweltz, supra note 7 (indicating a link has been established between
exposure to copper and Wilson's disease).
56. Id.
57. Gene Testing, HGP Info, supra note 41 ("One of the most serious
limitations of these susceptibility tests is the difficulty in interpreting a positive
result because some people who carry a disease-associated mutation never develop
the disease.").
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Genetic testing is already used in the workplace and serves two
important functions: monitoring and screening. First, genetic monitoring
is the periodic examination of a group of workers for chromosomal
changes and DNA damage.5" This effort serves to identify hazardous
environmental factors that can increase the workforce's risk of developing
cancer or other disorders. 9 The Occupational Safety and Health Agency
(OSHA) established monitoring programs within specific industries to
collect this type of data.60 For example, OSHA's lead testing programs
evaluate the health risks posed by exposure to chemical agents through
periodic blood tests and requires the employee's transfer if the exposure
exceeds safety levels.6' Secondly, genetic screening is a one-time test used
to identify an individual's susceptibility to a specific disease, based upon
that individual's genetic composition.62 It is this latter function that is the
subject of this comment.
III. TESTING: A METHOD TO DIFFERENTIATE, NOT DISCRIMINATE
If an employer determines that its interests are protected by the use of
genetic screening, the issue becomes how to use these tests in a
nondiscriminatory manner. The employment process is inherently
subjective. Ensuring that the process is conducted fairly and in the least
discriminatory manner, therefore, becomes a serious concern. This section
discusses the protections afforded by federal statutes to applicants and
employees subjected to genetic screening.
There is no federal statute directly addressing the possible
discriminatory effects of genetic screening. 63 However, a combination of
existing federal statutes can be interpreted to protect the rights of job
applicants and employees. Specifically, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII)' and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
65
combine to provide protection for an employee subjected to genetic
screening. Each statute specifically addresses the use of pre-employment
58. Pagnattaro, supra note 13, at 146.
59. Id.
60. Richter, supra note 11, at 210.
61. Id.
62. Id. See also Miller, supra note 39, at 230.
63. David J. Wukitsch, New York's Legal Restrictions on the Employer's
Collection and Use of An Employee's Genetic Information, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. &
TECH. 39, 43 (1998).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
65. Id. § 12101.
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testing of those individuals qualifying for protection under the statute.
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and
national origin.66 This statute has direct application when employers are
screening for illnesses that are linked to national origin, such as sickle cell
anemia, or sex, such as ovarian cancer. 67 The ADA prohibits
discrimination against qualified individuals with a disability. The ADA's
implementing agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), has extended the ADA's coverage to individuals with a genetic
predisposition.' Therefore, the ADA directly relates to the genetic
screening of applicants in an employment context.
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and
national origin.69 Title VII also identifies unlawful employment practices,
including intentional discrimination and disparate impacts.70 Employment
practices which classify, limit or segregate applicants and employees
include employers failing or refusing to hire an individual because of their
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.7 However, these employment
practices which diminish the opportunities of applicants and employees
are permitted under limited circumstances.72 It is also unlawful to
discriminate on these grounds with respect to compensation or privileges;73
or to limit, segregate or classify employees or applicants in a manner that
"would deprive, or tend to deprive," employment opportunities. 4 Title
VII applies because the use of genetic screening tends to deprive
employment opportunities from applicants and employees whose tests
screen positively for illnesses associated with national origin, race and sex.
66. See id. § 2000e-2.
67. See e.g., Norman Bloodsaw v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 135 F.3d 1260
(9th Cir. 1998) (one of the claims specified in this case is a violation of Title VII in
that black applicants were screened for sickle cell trait and female applicant was
screened for pregnancy).
68. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL SECTION ON THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM
"DISABILITY," 902.8, at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/902cm.html (last modified Feb.
1, 2000) [hereinafter EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL].
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
70. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
71. Id.
72. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
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As the enforcing agency of Title VII, the EEOC has established specific
guidelines concerning the use of employment selection criteria.7 ' The
EEOC's Uniform Guidelines On Employee Selection Procedures applies to
pre-employment tests and other selection procedures that are used as a
basis for employment decisions. 6 These guidelines consider employment
decisions, including hiring and promotion." Under these guidelines,
employers must use the least discriminatory selection procedure serving
the employer's legitimate interest in selecting an efficient and trustworthy
workforce."' The selection process must have a valid purpose, be as closely
related to the job as possible" and requires periodic review to ensure its
currency.Y In some cases, validity studies are required 81 to evaluate
alternative selection procedures and consider how best to use the intended
procedures to the least discriminatory impact."'
This section examines four cases that involve various issues related to
Title VII and the use of pre-employment testing. Two Supreme Court
cases, Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 83 and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,,o
address the use of employment-related testing, pursuant to Title VII.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. established the parameters for employment
testing.8 This 1971 case was followed in 1975 by Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody. In Albemarle Paper, the court defined the standard of proof for
job-related testing."6  The foundations established by these two
cornerstone cases were later used by the Supreme Court in a third case,
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.87 Johnson Controls dealt
75. Uniform Guidelines On Employee Selection Procedures (1978), 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607 (2002).
76. See id. § 1607.2(B).
77. See id.
7& See id. § 1607.3(B) ("Where two or more selection procedures are available
which serve the user's legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy
workmanship, and which are substantially equally valid for a given purpose, the
user should use the procedure which has been demonstrated to have the lesser
adverse impact.").
79. Id.
80. Id. § 1607.3.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
84. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
85. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-36.
86. Albermarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 424-35.
87. 499 U.S. 187 (1990).
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with a hazardous work environment and the management's discriminatory
attempt to reduce its adverse medical impacts on a portion of the work
force. Here, the Court held that where an employer's employment actions
are facially discriminatory, the employer must prove that the requirement
is a bona fide occupational qualification.8 The fourth is a case from the
Ninth Circuit, Norman-Bloodsaw v. Regents of the University of California,
which addresses the privacy issues related to genetic screening.
1. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: Better Qualified Workforce Defense is
Insufficient
Griggs was a case of first impression89 that considered whether Title VII
prohibited an employer's requirement of a high school diploma and the
passing of a standardized intelligence test as a condition of employment. 9°
Until 1965, Duke Power's hiring policy limited black applicants to
employment in its Labor department and required a high school diploma
for initial assignment or transfer to its other four departments.9' In 1965,
the company abandoned this policy,9' and later that same year, it upgraded
its hiring requirements. The new policy required the applicant to obtain
satisfactory scores on two professionally-prepared aptitude tests, as well as
have a high school diploma for placement in any its departments, with the
exception of Labor.93  Black employees brought claims against the
company for violations of Title VII. The company asserted that its 1965
employment policy was enacted to provide a better-qualified workforce,94
and that its use of general intelligence tests were "specifically permitted by
8& Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 200.
89. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429.
90. Id. at 427.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 428. The two professionally prepared aptitude tests were the:
Wonderlic Personnel Test, which purports to measure general
intelligence, and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test. Neither
was directed or intended to measure the ability to learn to perform a
particular job or category of jobs. The requisite scores used for both initial
hiring and transfer approximated the national median for high school
graduates," which were "more stringent than the high school requirement,




94. Id. at 431 (indicating a company vice president testified that the
requirements were instituted on the Company's judgment that they would
generally would improve the overall quality of the work force).
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Title VII as a 'professionally developed ability test,"' and not "designed,
intended or used to discriminate because of race." 95
In considering the claim, the Supreme Court noted the Congressional
objective of Title VII was to "[a]chive equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers" that in the past favored identifiable
groups.96 While pre-employment testing was authorized, 9' Congress placed
the burden on the employer to show that any given requirement did not
serve to "'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices." 98 The requirements also needed to demonstrate "a manifest
relationship to the employment in question."99 The EEOC procedures
interpreting the Act, required employers to provide data demonstrating
the employment test was "predictive of or significantly correlated with
important elements of work behavior, which comprise or are relevant to
the job or jobs for which the applicants are being evaluated."1°° Therefore,
the company's employment requirements had to relate to a specific
business necessity, be tailored to the specific position being sought and
could not be discriminatory.
The Court found that the company's interest in a better-qualified
workforce was too broad and therefore, lacked a specific business
necessity.°' The Court could not find a "demonstratable relationship"
between the company's hiring requirements and successful job
performance,'' though it indicated that the company's policy lacked
95. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433.
96. Id. at 429-30.
97. Id.
9& Id. at 431.
99. Id. at 432.
100. Id. at 433.
101. Id. ("The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited."). See also Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 308 n.44 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, J., dissenting) (n.44; ". . . disparate impact is a basis for relief under
Title VII only if the practice in question is not founded on 'business necessity'.
."1).
102 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32 (Company adopted employment requirements
"without meaningful study of their relationship to job-performance ability" but
rather "on the Company's judgment that they generally would improve the overall
quality of the work force". Evidence demonstrated that employees who have not
completed high school or taken the intelligence tests perform satisfactorily and
made progress in departments for which the high school and test criteria are now
used.).
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discriminatory intent.' 3 The Court noted that neither "good intent or
absence of discriminatory intent" will "redeem employment procedures or
testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability." '' Accordingly, the
Court held that nothing in the Act precluded the use of employment
testing or other measuring procedures. However, "these devices and
mechanisms [are without] controlling force unless they are demonstrably a
reasonable measure of job performance."'" 5
The Griggs holding began to shape the employer's requirements for the
use of pre-employment testing, including genetic screening. Griggs
indicates that pre-employment screening techniques may be used if they
have a direct correlation to the job being sought - even if there is a
discriminatory impact.' 6 Therefore, an employer using genetic screening
must ensure that there is a link between the disease being screened for and
the work environment in which the job is performed. For example, where
the work environment is composed of high levels of copper, the employer
would be justified to screen applicants for the genetic predisposition to
Wilson's disease.0 7 However, the employer in this example would be
unable to justify the use of tests that screen for diseases unrelated to
copper exposure, such as Alzheimer's or breast cancer.
103. Id. at 432. (finding the Company's lack of discriminatory intent is
suggested by special efforts to help the undereducated employees through
Company financing of two-thirds the cost of tuition for high school training.)
104. Id. at 432.
105. Id. at 436.
106. Id. at 431 (holding where an employment practice operates to exclude a set
of employees, the practice is prohibited if it cannot be shown to be related to job
performance).
107. See Sweltz, supra note 55, at 324 (suggesting link has been established
between exposure to copper and Wilson's disease). National Digestive Diseases
Information Clearing House, Wilson's Disease, at http://www.niddk.nih.govlhealth
/digest/summary/wilson/wilson.htm (last modified Feb. 2001.) (Wilson's disease is
hereditary. It causes the body to retain copper, which disrupts the liver's
functioning. Overtime, a copper buildup will be created that leads to damage in the
kidneys, brain and eyes. If not treated, Wilson's disease can cause severe brain
damage, liver failure and death. Symptoms usually appear between the ages of six
and twenty years, but can begin as late as age forty. The disease is treated with
lifelong use of D-penicillamine or trientine hydrochloride, drugs that help remove
copper from tissue. Patients will also need to take vitamin B6 and follow a low-
copper diet, which means avoiding mushrooms, nuts, chocolate, dried fruit, liver
and shellfish.).
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2. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody: Job-Relatedness-Measuring
Potential Job Performance
Four years later, the Supreme Court addressed pre-employment testing
in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.'°8  Here, the Court specifically
considered what the employer, who used pre-employment tests that were
racially discriminating in effect but not in intent, had to establish in order
to survive a Title VII challenge. Albemarle Paper Company's
employment process required applicants for employment in its skilled
labor categories to pass two standardized tests."° Because of the Griggs"n
decision, the company employed an industrial psychologist in an effort to
professionally verify the job relatedness of its testing program."'
However, employees brought suit under Title VII claiming that the tests
were discriminatory. The Supreme Court considered whether the criteria
considered in the pre-employment tests were sufficiently related to
petitioner's "legitimate interest in job-specific ability to justify a testing
system with a racially discriminatory impact.'
1 2
Noting its decision in Griggs, the Supreme Court reemphasized, "Title
VII forbids the use of employment tests that are discriminatory in effect,
unless the employer meets the burden of showing that any given
requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in
question."'' The Court held that to consider "the question of job
relatedness, the tests must be viewed in the context of the plant's
10& 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
109. Id. at 426 (The Revised Beta Examination, allegedly a measure of
nonverbal intelligence, and the Wonderlic Personnel Test, allegedly a measure of
verbal facility.).
110. Id. at 425 (In Griggs, the Court was construing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h),
which provides in pertinent part that it shall not:
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act
upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that
such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed,
intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.).
111. Id. at 411 (The study compared the test scores of current employees with
supervisorial judgments of their competence in ten job groupings selected from the
middle or top of the plant's skilled lines of progression. The study showed a
statistically significant correlation with supervisorial ratings in three job groupings
for the Beta Test, in seven job groupings for either Form A or Form B of the
Wonderlic Test, and in two job groupings for the required battery of both the Beta
and the Wonderlic Tests).
112- Id.
113. Id. at 425 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
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operation and the history of the testing program."...4 It looked to the
EEOC Guidelines, as it had in Griggs, for the test to determine whether
Albemarle's employment tests were job related."5 The Court noted that
even though the EEOC guidelines were not promulgated through the
formal procedures established by Congress, as the Act's agency tasked




The Court then established whether the company's employment testing
policy was "predictive of or significantly correlated with important
elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or
jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.""..7 The Court determined
that the company was unable to substantiate that the tests measured
potential job performance."8 Specifically, the company's validity study did
not involve an analysis of the attributes of, or the particular skills needed
in the studied job groups. "9 Nor did the study correctly compare test
scores with subjective supervisory rankings,2 ° or use test subjects that were
the same age, or similarly situated as to education and vocation as the
potential new employees. 2' The Court held that the company's test failed
to meet the job-relatedness test and remanded for further consideration.'22
Albemarle Paper establishes the job-relatedness standard for the use of
pre-employment testing requiring that the tests be predictive of or
significantly correlated to the important elements of work behavior
114. Albermarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425.
115. Id. at 431.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting 29 CFR § 1607.4(c)).
11& Id. ("Even if it had been otherwise adequate, the study would not have
"validated" the Beta and Wonderlic test battery for all of the skilled lines . .
119. Id. at 433 (quoting the EEOC Guidelines, 29 CFR §§ 1607.5 (b)(3)):
The work behaviors or other criteria of employee adequacy which the test
is intended to predict or identify must be fully described; and,
additionally, in the case of rating techniques, the appraisal form(s) and
instructions to the rater(s) must be included as a part of the validation
evidence. Such criteria may include measures other than actual work
proficiency, such as training time, supervisory ratings, regularity of
attendance and tenure. Whatever criteria are used they must represent
major or critical work behaviors as revealed by careful job analyses.).
120. Id. at 432.
121. Id. at 435 (noting validation studies only dealt with job-experienced, white
workers, though the pre-employment tests were to be given to new job applicants,
who are younger, largely inexperienced, and in many instances nonwhite).
122 Id. at 436.
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relating to the job or jobs for which the applicant is being considered.0 23
The Court found Albemarle's quantitative data lacking because it did not
accurately evaluate the position and it did not accurately reflect the
characteristics of the applicants. Griggs indicates that a "better qualified
workforce" is insufficient where the screening technique has a
discriminatory impact.124 Therefore, the employer must justify the use of
genetic screening based upon the characteristics of the position being
sought, its unique environmental factors and how it relates monetarily and
numerically to the applicant, the employer and the population.
Considerations, such as how many employees are at risk, would provide
justification for the use of genetic screening. For example, if the disease
effects only three percent of every ten million in the human population,
chances are the illness will not be considered predictive or significantly
correlated to a position with a company of 500 employees. However, it
could be a different outcome with a corporation the size of Wal-Mart
Stores with its 1,383,000 employees,'2 if the disease affected one in every
10,000 in the population. Secondly, the number of employees who have
contracted the disease in the past could be indicative of future illnesses.
This could be persuasive if the total were higher than the national average
or the employer could prove these employees were genetically disposed to
the disease. This would help to personalize the employer's analysis to the
work environment with the positions being sought. It would also help to
individualize the comparison of the applicant to the workplace. Where the
workforce is affected to a greater degree than the population, the
employer has a better ability to justify the use of genetic screening when
challenged because the work environment poses a threat to the health of
individuals with genetic predispositions. Therefore, Albemarle gives the
employer its second important element needed to justify the use of genetic
screening: the need to provide data demonstrating the use of genetic
screening is predictive of or significantly correlated with important
elements of work behavior.
123. Id. (quoting 29 CFR § 1607.4(c)). See also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434.
124. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
125. The 2002 Global 500, FORTUNE MAGAZINE (JULY 22, 2002), available at
http://www.fortune.com/lists/G500 (providing the number of people Wal-Mart
employs as part of its investment data).
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3. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc: Test All: Sex, Race Are
Not Indicative
In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court considered whether an
employer, seeking to protect potential fetuses, may discriminate against
women because of their ability to become pregnant.2 6 Johnson Controls,
Inc., was a battery manufacturer. The primary ingredient used in the
manufacturing of batteries is lead.' "Occupational exposure to lead
entails health risks, including the risk of harm to any fetus being carried by
a female employee."'2 8 Johnson Controls did not employ women prior to
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 129 In 1977, it issued its first
official policy warning female employees about the risks of carrying a child
while employed in lead-exposure work.30 This policy required any woman
who wished to be considered for employment to sign a statement that she
had been advised of the risks associated with having a child after being
exposed to lead. 3' In 1982, the company shifted its policy to one of
exclusion when eight employees became pregnant.'32 Each of these
women was found to have excessive levels of lead in their blood.' In
1984, a class action was brought challenging the company's fetal-
protection policy as sex discrimination that violated Title VII.'1
126. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 190 (1990).
127. See id.
12& See id.
129. Id. at 191. The 1977 policy read in part:
Protection of the health of the unborn child is the immediate and direct
responsibility of the prospective parents. While the medical profession
and the company can support them in the exercise of this responsibility, it
cannot assume it for them without simultaneously infringing their rights as
persons .... [s]ince not all women who can become mothers wish to
become mothers (or will become mothers), it would appear to be illegal





132. Id. (1982 policy: "It is [Johnson Controls'] policy that women who are
pregnant or who are capable of bearing children will not be placed into jobs
involving lead exposure or which could expose them to lead through the exercise
of job bidding, bumping, transfer or promotion rights.").
133. Id. at 191-92.
134. Id. at 192-93 (Petitioners included an individual who had chosen to be
sterilized in order to avoid losing her job, one who suffered a loss in compensation
when she was transferred out of a job where she was exposed to lead and a man
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Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the lower courts had
erroneously assumed that "sex-specific fetal-protection policies did not
involve facial discrimination."'35 As such, the lower courts had applied the
more lenient business necessity rule to the case, rather than a bona fide
occupation qualification (BFOQ) defense to uphold the company's
policy.'36 Upon review of Johnson Controls' policy, the Court found it
"classifies on the basis of gender and childbearing capacity, rather than
fertility alone."'37 The Court noted that the company disregarded evidence
that lead exposure was equally as debilitating on the male reproductive
system as it is on women.' The Court found Johnson Controls' policy was
"not neutral because it does not apply to the reproductive capacity of the
company's male employees in the same way as it applies to that of the
females."'3 9 In examining the company's motive, it found the policy was
not applied with a malevolent motive.'4 However, the Court stated that
this benign motive would not "convert a facially discriminatory policy into
a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect.' 4 ' The Court found that
"Johnson Controls' fetal-protection policy was sex discrimination
forbidden under Title VII unless [the company could] establish that sex is
a "bona fide occupational qualification." 142
who had been denied a request for a leave of absence for the purpose of lowering
his lead level because he intended to become a father. The certified class
consisted of "all past, present and future production and maintenance employees"
in United Auto Workers bargaining units at nine of Johnson Controls' plants
"who have been and continue to be affected by [the employer's] Fetal Protection
Policy implemented in 1982.").
135. Id. at 197-99.
136. Id. at 193-96 (The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits used the three step
business necessity inquiry established in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, 726
F. 2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984), and Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F. 2d 1172 (4th Cir.
1982) which asks "whether there is a substantial health risk to the fetus; whether
transmission of the hazard to the fetus occurs only through women; and whether
there is a less discriminatory alternative equally capable of preventing the health
hazard to the fetus.").
137. International Union, 499 U.S. at 198.
13& Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 199.
141. Id.
142 Id. at 200 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)), "Under § 703(e)(1) of Title
VII, an employer may discriminate on the basis of "religion, sex, or national origin
in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification.").
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A bona fide occupational qualification, the Court explained, is written
and applied narrowly."' The company argued that its fetal-protection
policy fell within the so-called safety exception to the BFOQ. However,
the Court noted that the safety exception applied to cases that
discriminate on the basis of sex because of safety concerns, meaning the
concerns had to be more than just a danger to a woman herself to justify
discrimination.' " Such discrimination had only been allowed where there
was a high correlation between sex and the ability to perform the job, and
where a third party was endangered.' The Court emphasized that these
cases did not classify the fetus as a third party, and found its welfare best
left to its mother.'" Therefore, the Court held that "the safety exception is
limited to instances in which sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the
employee's ability to perform the job.', 47 Because of the company's
"professed moral and ethical concerns about the welfare of the next
generation do not suffice to establish a BFOQ of female sterility," the
fetal-protection policy was held to be an illegal sex-based discrimination,
prohibited under Title VII.'
Johnson Controls contributes an additional guideline for employers
using genetic screening. Where an employer's actions are facially
discriminatory, the employer must prove that the requirement is a
BFOQ' 9 A BFOQ defense puts a greater burden on the employer than
does the business necessity rule of Griggs5 ° As with the employer in
Johnson Controls whose work environment adversely affected the
employees' reproductive systems, the employer using genetic screening
143. Id. at 201 (The wording of the BFOQ defense contains restrictive terms
indicating that the "exception reaches only special situations." It is thus limited to
the situations in which discrimination is permissible to 'certain instances' where sex
discrimination is reasonably necessary "to the 'normal operation' of the
'particular' business." The court asserted, "the most telling term is 'occupational';
[that] indicates that these objective, verifiable requirements must concern job-
related skills and aptitudes.").
144. Id. at 202.
145. Id. (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-37 (1977) (In Dothard,
the Court allowed the employer to hire only male guards in contact areas of
maximum-security male penitentiaries. The Court also reviewed a series of cases
approving airline layoffs of pregnant flight attendants on the ground that the
employers' policy was necessary to ensure the safety of passengers' flight.).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 204.
148 Id. at 206.
149. Id. at 193-98.
150. Id. at 198.
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has established a direct link between the hazardous work environment and
the harm that it could inflict upon individuals with a specific genetic
predisposition. Where the employer is screening for a genetic
predisposition to an illness that affects predominately one sex, or is
common among a specific race or national origin, the employer must
screen all applicants. If the employer does not screen all applicants, the
employer becomes vulnerable to discrimination charges under Title VII.
Johnson Controls illustrates this because the employer ignored the health
risks to both sexes and focused its restrictive fetal policy only on its female
employees.
Another example would involve a situation where a company is
concerned about its employees' exposure to high levels of carbon
monoxide in their work environment.' Upon being advised that the work
environment could be particularly harmful to those with sickle cell
anemia, the employer begins to screen all African American applicants.
This testing would be facially discriminatory because sickle cell anemia
also affects those of Arabic, Greek, Italian and Latin American descent, as
well as Caucasians and those from India.'52 Therefore, where the employer
chooses to screen for genetic predispositions to an illness related to the
work environment, the employer must not make assumptions about its
applicants' ancestry and must screen all applicants.
4. Norman-Bloodsaw v. the Regents of the University of California:
Privacy Protection and Consent
In Norman-Bloodsaw v the Regents of the University of California, the
issue considered was "whether a clerical or administrative worker who
undergoes a general employee health examination may, without his
knowledge, be tested for highly private and sensitive medical and genetic
information such as syphilis, sickle cell trait and pregnancy. ,13 Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory required its contractors to perform mandatory pre-
placement medical examinations on applicants.' These exams were
151. Carbon Monoxide Poisoning, OSHA Fact Sheet, 1 (Identifies specific
professions and industries at risk to high exposure to carbon monoxide).
152. The Sickle Cell Information Center, Sickle Cell Anemia, at
http://www.emory.edu/PEDS/SICKLE (last modified June 11, 2002).
153. Norman - Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1264.
154. Id. at 1264-65 (As one of the Department of Energy's (DOE) contractors,
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory performed preplacement examinations from 1981
to 1995 as expressed conditions of employment. The mandatory preplacement
examination occurred after the offer of employment but prior to the assumption of
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conducted after a conditional offer of employment was made but before
the assumption of duties.'55 The exams required the employees to
complete a detailed medical history questionnaire and provide urine and
blood samples. 56 These samples were tested for syphilis.'57 Samples taken
from female applicants were also subjected to a pregnancy test,'58 while
samples received from African-American applicants were tested for the
sickle cell trait.9 Lawrence stopped these tests in the early 1990s.' 6 While
applicants consented to the pre-employment medical examine, the specific
tests to which the applicant's samples would be submitted were not. 6'
Several former and current employees 62 challenged these pre-employment
medical exams under several claims. The two claims germane to this
discussion are the asserted violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the implied right to privacy as guaranteed by the United States'
Constitution. 63 Lawrence contended that it had a legitimate interest in
conducting the exams and, further, that the employees had consented.'9
In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendant, the Ninth Circuit found the district court erred in dismissing
the claim.6 The Ninth Circuit explained that Title VII applies where
employers discriminate with respect to the 'terms' or 'conditions' by
establishing illicit classifications for ongoing employment and where
job duties. Prior to 1992, the preplacement exam required syphilis testing as part
of the preplacement examination.).
155. Id. at 1265 ("In the course of these examinations, plaintiffs completed
medical history questionnaires and provided blood and urine samples. The
questionnaires asked, inter alia, whether the patient had ever had any of sixty-one
medical conditions, including sickle cell anemia, 'venereal disease,' and, in the case





160. Id. at 1265 (Syphilis testing was discontinued in April 1993 because of its
limited usefulness in screening healthy populations. Pregnancy testing became
optional in December 1994. Sickle cell trait testing was discontinued in June 1995
because, by that time, most African-American adults had already been tested at
birth.).
161. Id. at 1268.
162. Id. at 1264.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 1266-70.
165. Id. at 1275.
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individuals may obtain employment.1'6 The Ninth Circuit found that the
claims fell "neatly within the Title VII framework. 167 Specifically, the
employment of women and blacks at Lawrence was "conditioned in part
on allegedly unconstitutional invasions of privacy to which white and/or
male employees were not subjected."' The Ninth Circuit held that where
a "'term or condition' requiring unconstitutional invasion of privacy is,
without doubt, actionable under Title VII," and even if they were not
unconstitutional, this term or condition would still be "based on an illicit
category as described by the statute and thus a proper basis for a Title VII
action., , "6
In considering the privacy issue, the Ninth Circuit noted there is a
constitutionally protected privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters that clearly encompasses medical information and its
confidentiality. 7 ° Violations of privacy that include the collection of
medical information are examined "under the rubric of the Fourth
Amendment.' 7. Therefore, Lawrence's interest in conducting these tests
was balanced "against the plaintiffs' expectations of privacy.' ' 2  This
balancing test must include consideration of the tests' intrusiveness, the
state's interests in requiring that intrusion and the efficacy of the state's
means for meeting its needs. However, the Ninth Circuit could "think of
few subject areas more personal and more likely to implicate privacy
interests than that of one's health or genetic make-up. 1 73 Furthermore,
166. Id. at 1271 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)), (The Ninth Circuit also found
support in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which precludes discrimination on
account of sex, including pregnancy, childbirth and related medical conditions.).
See also id. § 2000e(k).
167. Norman - Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1272.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1269. The Supreme Court has recognized that while the taking of a
bodily fluid sample implicates one's privacy interests, "the ensuing chemical
analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further intrusion of the
tested employee's privacy interests." Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
171. Id. at 1269. "These tests may also be viewed as searches in violation of
Fourth Amendment rights that require Fourth Amendment scrutiny. The tests at
issue in this case thus implicate rights protected under both the Fourth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments." Yin v. California, 95 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1996).
172. Norman - Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269.
173. Id. See also Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
("Extension of the right to confidentiality to personal medical information
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the Ninth Circuit found the medical conditions screened for by the tests
were highly sensitive and constitutionally prohibited where "employer
inquiries into personal sexual matters that have no bearing on job
performance.' 74
Norman-Bloodsaw reiterates that the employer bears a heavy
burden in justifying the use of sensitive medical information in
employment decisions. This burden is imposed because of the privacy
rights of the applicants. Genetic screening is a direct examination of a
tissue sample, usually blood, which is scanned for a specific genetic
mutation in the DNA. 75 Because the test results provide highly personal
information, the employer must ensure that the applicant understands and
consents to the procedure. As the Ninth Circuit noted, there "would, of
course, be no violation if the testing were authorized.' ' 176 The privacy
issues involved with genetic screening also require the employer to respect
and protect that privacy by ensuring effective safeguards for the protection
of the information.
In summary, these four cases illustrate how an employer may conduct a
genetic screening program without violating Title VII. Griggs offers the
rule that where employment testing is used it must have a manifest
relationship to the employment in question. "' This means the tests must
relate to a specific business necessity, be tailored to the specific position
being sought and not be discriminatory. Albemarle places the burden on
the employer to provide data demonstrating the employment test is
"predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work
behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which
recognizes there are few matters that are quite so personal as the status of one's
health"); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 at 658 (D. Or.
1995) (noting under Fourth Amendment analysis that "it is significant that the
tests at issue here look only for drugs, and not for whether the student is, for
example, epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.").
174. Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269. See also Schowengerdt v. General
Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Thorne v. City of El
Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 470 (9th Cir. 1983) The Ninth circuit stated, "syphilis is an
intimate matter that pertains to one's sexual history and may invite tremendous
amounts of social stigma." Pregnancy is likewise, for many, an intensely private
matter, which also may pertain to one's sexual history and often carries far-
reaching societal implications. Finally, "the carrying of sickle cell trait can pertain
to sensitive information about family history and reproductive decisionmaking.").
175. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269. See also Casey, supra note 15.
176. Norman -Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1270.
177. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
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candidates are being evaluated.' ' 78 Johnson Controls establishes the need
to test all applicants and not interject personal perceptions into the testing
process. Norman-Bloodsaw illustrates the importance for careful
consideration of testing policies and procedures to protect the applicant's
privacy. While each of these Title VII cases finds fault with the application
of the employment policies, they did not ban the use of employment tests
and policies when they are conducted in a nondiscriminatory manner.
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
In addition to Title VII, the American with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA)7 9 extends protection to individuals with a genetic predisposition to
an illness. "o This is based upon two foundations. The first is the ADA's
definition of a disability, which covers those individuals who are
discriminated against because they are regarded as having an
impairment."' The second is the 1995 EEOC Compliance Manual that
expands the definition of "disability" to include "individuals who are
subjected to discrimination on the basis of genetic information relating to
illness, disease, or other disorders."' 82 This section will review the ADA's
protection and how it extends to the individuals with genetic
predispositions. First, this section reviews the terms of the Act itself to
define its protections and understand how it may apply to individuals with
genetic predispositions. Second, this section considers the restrictions
placed upon employment practices. Together, these two sections will
provide a roadmap with which to consider the extent of any ADA
prohibition against the use of genetic screening in the employment
process.
178. Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 431 (The message of these Guidelines is the same
as that of the Griggs case -- that discriminatory tests are impermissible unless
shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be "predictive of or significantly
correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are
relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.").
179. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC §§12101-213 (1994).
180. See generally Seltzer, supra note 16.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c) (2000). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).
182. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 68, at 902.8.
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1. Provisions Protecting Individuals with Genetic Predispositions:
Perceptions Count
Congress established the ADA "to combat societal discrimination
against individuals with disabilities."'83  The ADA prohibits employers
from "discriminating against qualified individuals" regarding disability in
job application procedures, promotions, discharging employees, employee
compensation, job training and conditions and privileges of employment.'9
Only truly 'qualified individuals with a disability' are protected by ADA. 5
A qualified individual is a person "with a disability, who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that the individual holds or desires.', 86 The term
"disability", as defined by the ADA, means: "(1) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being
regarded as having such an impairment. '8' Therefore, a person must meet
at least one of these criteria to be considered disabled under the Act. The
ADA does not define 'major life activities.' However, the Act has
incorporated by reference regulations issued under the Rehabilitation Act
188 that specifically define major life activities and contain a non-exhaustive
list of tasks "repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-day
existence."'89 This list includes activities of daily living such as caring for
one's self, walking, seeing, and speaking.'9
Within its regulations, the EEOC defines how genetic screening is
treated under the ADA.'9' The regulations state that employers "that
183. Amanda J. Wong, Distinguishing Speculative and Substantial Risk in the
Presymptomatic Job Applicant: Interpreting the Interpretation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act Direct Threat Defense, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1140 (2000).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000).
185. Miller, supra note 39, at 238.
186. 42 U.S.C. §12111(8) (2002) (These individuals either work for or are
applying for positions with employers who are engaged in an industry affecting
commerce and employ more than fifteen full time employees, or their agents.
However, the ADA does not apply to the United States' Government, or those
corporations wholly owned by the United States' Government.). See also Wong,
supra note 183, at 1142-43.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000); See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).
188. 42 U.S.C. §12201(a) (2000). 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(ii)(1997).
189. Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 660 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting
opinion.).
190. Id. at 659.
191. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 68, at 902.8.
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discriminate against individuals on the basis of such genetic information
are regarding the individual as having impairments that substantially limit
a major life activity" and therefore is regarded as having such an
impairment.192 The regulation provides an illustrative example that is very
similar to our discussion here. In this case, an applicant is determined to
have an increased susceptibility to colon cancer."' The cancer is
asymptomatic and may never develop into colon cancer. However, in this
example the employer rescinds their conditional offer of employment
upon learning about the test because of "concerns about matters such as
[the applicant's] productivity, insurance costs, and attendance."'' The
EEOC would find the applicant was treated as having "an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity."'1 95 As such, the applicant is
considered to have a "disability. 1 96 An individual refused employment
because of a genetic predisposition to an illness is considered disabled
under the act. However, this does not complete the analysis for a finding
of discrimination. While the Act itself establishes restrictions upon the
employer's employment practices, it also provides the employer with
specific defenses to claims of discrimination.
2. Restrictions on Employment Practices and Defined Limited
Defenses: Direct Threat
The ADA limits employers' discriminatory employment practices.
Simply, an employer is prohibited from discriminating against a qualified
individual with a disability.' The EEOC defines discrimination to include
"using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria
that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability, or a
class of individuals with disabilities, unless the standard, test or selection
criteria ... is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is
consistent with business necessity."' 98  Employers are prohibited from
"limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way
that adversely affects their opportunities."'" Employers may not use
192. Id. at 902 (referencing 136 CONG. REC. H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Owens); Id. at H4624-25 (statement of Rep. Edwards); Id. at





197. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
198. See id. § 12112(b)(6).
199. See id. § 12112.
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qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that
screen out, or tend to screen out, an individual with a disability or a class
of individuals with disabilities "unless it is shown to be job-related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity. '" However,
an employer is not required to hire or promote an individual "if such
action would create a 'direct threat,"' meaning a significant risk, to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation." EEOC regulations have interpreted this clause to
include a significant risk to one's own health or safety, as well as that of
third parties.0 2
The ADA limits pre-employment inquiries to the applicant's ability to
perform job-related functions.0 3 An employer may not ask whether the
applicant has a disability or question the nature or severity of such
disability. °m Pre-employment medical examinations are prohibited unless
it is job-related and consistent with business necessity.2 5  A medical
examination may be conducted after an offer of employment has been
206made but before commencement of employment. Such an offer may be
a condition of an employment if all entering employees are subjected to an
examination regardless of disability and information obtained concerning
the medical condition or history is treated as a confidential medical record
and appropriately safeguarded.
The ADA provides the employer with several defenses, two of which
are germane to this discussion .2 ' The first defense states that an employer
may counter a claim of discrimination by proving that the qualification
200. See id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
201. See id. §12111(3).
202. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2002):
The determination that an individual poses a 'direct threat' shall be based
on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely
perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based
on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical
knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. In
determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors
to be considered include: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and
severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm
will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (2000).
204. See id. § 12112(d)(2)(A).
205. See id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
206. See id. § 12112(d)(3)(A)&(B).
207. See id. § 12112(d)(3)(B).
20& See id. § 12113(a).
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standards, tests or selection criteria used in the employment process are
job-related, consistent with business necessity and such performance
cannot be accomplished by a reasonable accommodation.2' Secondly, the
ADA establishes the so-called 'direct threat' defense by requiring "that an
individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace."2t In interpreting the ADA, the EEOC has
expanded the scope of the direct threat defense by stating that
qualification standards may include a requirement that "an individual not
pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace."'2'. However, there is no direct threat defense if the employer
could have made a reasonable accommodation."2
3. Divining Reality: Discriminatory or Not
In the EEOC's example of the applicant with the susceptibility, or
genetic predisposition, to colon cancer, the EEOC directs that such
applicants are considered disabled within the terms of the ADA because
of their perceived disability.1 3 This establishes a solid foundation upon
which applicants, who are refused employment because of their genetic
predisposition, can bring an ADA discrimination suit against the
offending employer. In order to prevail against such a claim, the employer
must use the ADA's defense clauses to their advantage."' Where an
employer can prove that the qualification standards are job-related,
consistent with business necessity and that a reasonable accommodation
cannot be provided, the employer will prevail.215 Additionally, the EEOC
regulations allow an employer not to hire an individual who will be
harmed by the work environment.2"6
In comparing the EEOC's scenario to the employer, business necessity
becomes important. Unlike the employer in the EEOC's example, our
employer has identified a specific business necessity: to maintain a safe
work environment. Secondly, there is a job-related element: the unique
properties of the work environment will have a harmful effect on the
209. Id.
210. See id. § 12113(b).
211. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(r).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). See Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d
446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996).
213. See id. § 12102(2)(c).
214. See id. § 12113(a).
215. Id.
216. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(r).
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applicant. The employer is screening only for those illnesses that relate to
the chemicals and toxins in the company's work environment, not for
illnesses related to high costs and absenteeism. Unlike the EEOC
employer, this employer is screening applicants for a predisposition for
Wilson's disease since, as employees, they would be exposed to high levels
of copper. As such, the employer has established a qualification standard
that prevents the applicant from being placed in an environment in which
he will most likely suffer harm."7  If our employer was able to
accommodate the applicant through some means of reasonable
accommodation, then the employer loses his defense." 8 However, if the
employer does not have the ability to protect the applicant from the
workplace exposure, he is unable to provide the applicant with a
reasonable accommodation. Therefore, the employer's actions would not
be considered discriminatory. By narrowly defining an objective that
relates specifically to the work environment and is applied consistently
with the terms of the ADA and Title VII, including appropriate privacy
safeguards and the application of the testing to all applicants, an employer
can use genetic screening within the employment process. This conclusion
is supported by the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal.'1 9
4. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabal: The Employer Decides Acceptable
Risk?
The direct threat defense, with its subset - the threat-to-self defense, is
at the heart of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal20 This case involved
Chevron's refusal to hire Mr. Echazabal because he had Hepatitis C.2'
Mr. Echazabal applied for a position in Chevron's California oil refinery
that would expose him to toxins that would aggravate his illness.f2 The
illness was identified during Mr. Echazabal's pre-employment physical .
Chevron's physicians, after consulting with Mr. Echazabal's treating
physician, determined that "exposure to hepatotoxic chemicals involved in
the job 'would further damage [Mr. Echazabal's] already reduced liver
capacity,' ... 'seriously endanger[ing] his health,' and 'potentially causing
217. See id. § 1630.2(r). See also Wong, supra note 183, at 1135.
218. Id.
219. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2045 (2002).
220. Id. at 2047. See also Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1064.
221. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 122 S.Ct. at 2048.
222. Id.
223. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1065.
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his death."' 2 ' As such, Chevron withdrew its employment offer. 225 Mr.
Echazabal filed suit claiming that Chevron had violated the ADA in
refusing to hire him to work at the refinery or to continue his current
employment with Chevron's contractor. 226 Chevron argued that its
decision not to hire Mr. Echazabal was in compliance with EEOC
regulations allowing employers to decline to hire individuals where the
work environment poses a direct threat to the applicant's health and
safety.2 7 Mr. Echazabal appealed the District Court's grant of Chevron's
request for summary judgment to the Ninth Circuit7m The Ninth Circuit
looked to the text of the ADA and determined that Congress had
intended the ADA's direct threat defense to limit the employer's ability to
decline to hire an applicant where the applicant posed a threat to other
individuals, but that this did not extend to the applicants themselves.229
The Ninth Circuit discounted Chevron's argument that the applicant's
ability to work in the environment, without posing a threat to the
applicant's health, was an essential function of the job.230 Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's award of summary judgment and
limited the meaning of the direct threat defense."1 This placed the Ninth
Circuit in direct opposition to the Eleventh Circuit. 2 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 33
The Court considered whether the ADA permits employers to refuse
"to hire an individual because his performance on the job would endanger
224. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2-7, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal,
122 S. Ct. 456 (2001).
225. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2048.
226. Id.
227. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1065-1066 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2)(2001)).
228. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2048.
229. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1066 -1068.
230. Id. at 1070.
231. Id. at 1070-71.
232 Id at 1075 (In Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc. 97 F.3d 446 (11th Cir.
1996), the Eleventh Circuit held that an employer may fire a disabled employee if
the disability renders the employee a direct threat to his or her own health or
safety. In Moses, the employee had epilepsy and had seizures on the job. Because
his assigned tasks presented grave risks to an employee with a seizure disorder,
and the employee did not prove he did not pose such a risk, the court upheld the
discharge.). See also Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2048, that raised ". ..
tension with the Seventh Circuit case of Kosciusko v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177
F.3d 599, 603 (1999)."
233. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1075.
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his own health, owing to a disability." ' The Court noted that federal law
allows employers an affirmative defense to claims of discrimination under
specific qualification standards that are "shown to be job-related ... and
consistent with business necessity." 35 This standard may also include "a
requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to other
individuals in the workplace." Additionally, the EEOC regulations
interpreting this affirmative defense, expanded its coverage to include the
employer's refusal to hire disabled applicants who may be harmed by the
work environment.7 It is the EEOC regulation, with its 'threat-to-self'
provision, upon which Chevron relied. 38
Mr. Echazabal argued the canon expresio unius exclusio alterius in an
attempt to prove that the ADA's direct threat defense did not include the
'threat-to-self' provision. 239  This canon allows the exclusion of an
unmentioned item of an associated group if one item is expressed .2  Mr.
Echazabal argued that because 'threat to others' was included within the
statute, the EEOC could not expand the meaning to include a 'threat to
self.'241' The Court was not persuaded for three reasons. First, the Court
determined that Congress defined the defensive categories spaciously
enough to give an agency or court "a good deal of discretion in setting the
limits of permissible qualification standards., 242 Additionally, by using the
phrase 'may include,' the meaning "points directly away" from the
exclusivity Mr. Echazabal advocated. 243 Secondly, the canon requires a
234. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 122 S.Ct. at 2047 n.1. The Court left unanswered "the
further issue passed upon by the Ninth Circuit, which held that the respondent is a
"'qualified individual"' who "can perform the essential functions of the
employment position." The Court stated that:
the issue will only resurface if the Circuit concludes that the decision of
respondent's employer to exclude him was not based on the sort of
individualized medical enquiry required by the regulation, an issue on
which the District Court granted summary judgment for petitioner and
which we leave to the Ninth Circuit for initial appellate consideration if
warranted.
Id.







242 Id. at 2050.
243. ld.
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defined grouping." However, there is no uniform interpretation among
the Federal Agencies interpreting the categories.245 Lastly, the Court
found that there "was no deliberate stopping point" to Mr. Echazabal's
limited interpretation.2' As such, the 'threat to self' defense is not only
available to the employer, but the employer would be unable to defend a
refusal to hire an applicant who's disability would threaten others outside
the workplace.247 This would mean that an employer would have "been
defenseless if [Typhoid] Mary had sued after being turned away[.]"2"8
The Court found that since Congress had not spoken exhaustively on
threats to workers' health, that the EEOC's regulation can "claim
adherence . . . so long as it makes sense of the statutory defense for
qualification standards that are 'job related and consistent with business
necessity. '"'2 9 The Court found that Chevron's "reasons for calling the
regulation reasonable" included moral concerns, and an interest in
"avoid[ing] time lost to sickness, excessive turnover from medical
retirement or death, litigation under state tort law, and the risk of violating
the national Occupational Safety and Health Act."' 0  Over Mr.
Echazabal's arguments to the contrary, the Court found these
considerations legitimate and sufficient to "show that the regulation is
entitled to survive. ' ' 51
Overall, the Court's decision has validated the EEOC's interpretation
that an employer may refuse to hire an applicant when the applicant may
pose a direct threat to the health and safety of others and where the work
environment may pose a direct threat to the health of the applicant. Here
Mr. Echazabal had Hepatitis C.252 Therefore; this case specifically applies
to applicants who are symptomatic. Whether the case could apply to
presymptomatic applicants who are seeking employment in environments
with toxins and chemicals that could trigger a disease to which they have a
244. Id. (quoting E. Crawford, Construction of Statutes 337 (1940). "The canon
depends on identifying a series of two or more terms or things that should be
understood to go hand in hand, which are abridged in circumstances supporting a
sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded.").




249. Id. at 2052.
250. Id. (citing to Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1590, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2002)).
251. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 122 S. Ct. at 2052.
252. Id. at 2048.
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specific predisposition remains unanswered. However, this case supports
the employer's use of genetic screening where it is reasonable, job-related,
and a business necessity.
IV. EMPLOYER'S REQUIREMENTS FOR TESTING
We have considered Title VII, along with its supporting case law, and
the ADA to determine what protections exist for the employee. Title VII
protects employees who are subjected to genetic screening relating to race,
sex or national origin. 3 This protection, however, does not prohibit the
use of such tests.254 It only requires that employment tests and screening
criteria, of which genetic screening is a subset, be related to the position to
which the applicant is applying and have a business necessity. These
requirements are mirrored in the wording of the ADA, which offers its
protections to those with genetic predispositions that have been denied
employment. Additionally, the employer must be able to justify the use of
the exam by proving its results cannot be achieved by less discriminatory
means. Title VII would require the employer to conduct genetic screening
in a non-discriminatory manner. This requirement to conduct these tests
in a nondiscriminatory manner is also contained in the ADA.255
Specifically, the employer must ensure that all applicants are screened.
Title VII prohibits screening decisions based on perceptions about gender,
race or national origin. 6 The ADA further prohibits screening and
screening decisions based upon stereotypes, patronizing assumptions or
generalized fear.27 While Title VII applies to a subset of applicants, only
those where sex, national origin or race were factors, the ADA applies to
all applicants who are subjected to genetic screening and have been
refused employment because of a genetic predisposition."
However, simply because an employee falls within the protection of the
ADA, does not prohibit the use of genetic screening techniques. As the
Supreme Court demonstrated in Chevron, the direct threat defense will
allow the employer to decline to hire symptomatic applicants where the
work environment poses a direct threat to the health of the applicant.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
254. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31.
255. 42 U.S.C. §12112(a) (2000).
256. See id. § 2000e-3.
257. 29 C.F.R 1630.2(r). See also School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 173, 187
(1987) (individualized inquiry necessary to protect individual from unfounded
prejudice or stereo types).
258. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
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Such a condition establishes a business necessity and job-relatedness
elements of the ADA's affirmative defense to discrimination claims.
Whether the holding of Chevron will extend to the use of genetic
screening of presymptomatic applicants remains to be seen. However,
Chevron does support the employer's authority to determine job
qualifications based upon the environment's effects on employee health.
For all of this, a question remains-should an employer test? This
question is different than the one presented at the beginning of this text.
'Can' and 'should' are quite different. Within the given parameters of the
federal statutes, an employer can use genetic screening to identify
applicants with genetic predispositions and decline to hire them. But the
answer to the 'should' question is far more complex. The decision to test
is a business decision that encompasses the consideration of a variety of
factors. Some of those factors have been previously discussed because
they lay the factual foundation for the employer's job-relatedness and
business necessity defenses. Information establishing the link between the
work environment and its impact upon employee health, how many
employees have contracted the disease, what the possible impact is of
employees contracting the disease in the future are all included in that
decision. This information still does not answer all of the questions. The
'should' question must take into account the reality of the technology and
public perception, as well as potential change within the respective
environment.
The use of genetic screening to determine adult-onset disorders, such as
Alzheimer's, is premature. 2 9 Technology has not advanced to the stage
where there is a high degree of accuracy in identifying when, if at all, these
diseases will begin to wage their quiet, debilitating war within the body.2"
The medical research community has cited difficulty in interpreting the
test results as creating sufficient uncertainties to prevent the tests usage as
more than a research tool.261  Because of this noted inaccuracy, an
employer's reliance on these test could be seen as unreasonable and erode
the employer's defenses under the ADA and Title VII. Additionally,
there is a matter of employee and public perception. Echazabal is
different from our genetic screening scenarios because Mr. Echazabal is ill.
259. Gene Testing, HGP Info, supra note 41. See also Miller, supra note 39, at
231 ("other genetic tests of uncertain predictability are used to determine the
presence of genetic mutations linked to diseases like cystic fibrosis and
Alzheimer's Disease.").
260. Id. (predictive ability of tests is limited because they only forecast a mere
possibility).
261. Id. See also Casey, supra note 15.
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However, medical science has advanced enough to link Mr. Echazabal's
illness with Chevron's work environment. Chevron's denial of
employment resonates with the reasonable person who would not want
more harm to be inflicted upon an ill person. Company-implemented
safety programs have a positive impact upon the employees because they
make employees feel as if Chevron, a corporate giant, cares about their
health and safety.262 An applicant with a genetic predisposition is,
nevertheless, a healthy person. Denying this individual employment due
to some probability of future disease erodes the caring illusion and
adversely impacts employee moral. Therefore, the employer must give
careful consideration to the full range of repercussions created by the use
of genetic screening.
V: CONCLUSION
Genetic screening is only a tool, though its current reliability is
questionable. When technology advances to the point where its predictive
powers improve, it will serve to benefit both employers and applicants.
While employers realize a healthier and more efficient workforce, the
applicant will gain valuable information about their health. This
information may serve to lay the foundation for life choices that could
increase the applicant's life span and improve the applicant's quality of
life.
Genetic screening, however, is not a tool to be wielded by every
employer. It is for those employers whose profession or industry requires
constant and repeated exposure to those environmental factors, including
copper, carbon monoxide, cyanide, lead or radiation, known to trigger the
onset to specific genetic disorders such as Wilson's disease, sickle cell
anemia and breast cancer. This tool's application is limited to a small
arena by the provisions of Title VII and the ADA, that require specificity
as to how it relates to a specific job and business necessities. Where these
provisions cannot be articulated and supported with factual data, the
application of such tests would be discriminatory and therefore prohibited.
262. Neville, supra note 23.
2002]

